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Sustaining economic expansion 
in Pakistan in an era of
energy shortfalls:
growth options to 20351
Robert Looney
Abstract
Pakistan’s recent economic acceleration together with rapid rates 
of population growth is having a significant impact on the country’s 
energy supply/demand balances. Energy supplies in turn affect the 
pace and pattern of the country’s economic expansion. Drawing on 
the empirically-based complex links between energy and the econ-
omy, several alternative scenarios of growth and energy needs are 
developed in an attempt to answer several key questions. In partic-
ular, what are some of the key interrelationships between sources 
of energy demand and supply? What are the economic growth con-
sequences of alternative energy availabilities and, in turn, how do 
these growth patterns affect the subsequent energy supply and de-
mand patterns? What energy strategies are suggested by the inter-
connection between the country growth requirements and energy 
needs? Are these significantly modified under rising or falling ener-
gy prices? Based on this analysis, several guidelines are drawn for 
the country’s future energy policy.
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ITH RAPID ECONOMIC growth in recent years, Pakistan’s demand 
for energy has been increasing at the rate of 10–12 per cent per an-
num. However, the country’s rather static oil, hydroelectric power and 
gas reserves have raised serious concerns as to the sustainability of the cur-
rent economic expansion, as well as future economic growth. The gap be-
tween Pakistan’s energy use and the country’s ability to produce energy has 
widened in an alarming way in recent years (figure 1).
As a means of responding to the country’s lagging energy supply, the Govern-
ment has drawn up a 25-year plan (2005–30) for expanding energy production.2 Initial 
cost estimates are staggering – $37–40 billion, with an average annual investment of 
approximately $1.5 bn. Given the country’s low rate of domestic savings, much of this 
expense will have to be met by increased flows of foreign aid, external borrowing, and 
direct foreign investment – all of which can be somewhat problematic.
W
Figure 1
Pakistan: energy production consumption gap, 1971–2003
Pakistan’s energy plan provides an excellent overview of the challenges fac-
ing the country over the next several decades, and it provides a sound, practical, 
framework for identifying short-term, as well as medium and longer term needs. The 
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emphasis on developing indigenous sources of energy is sound, especially in light of 
the country’s vast coal deposits and hydroelectric potential. On the other hand, one 
might question several of the key assumptions upon which the plan is based. The 
plan assumes high sustained rates of economic growth – above 7.5 per cent will be 
the norm for the future. This pace of economic expansion in turn defines many of the 
country’s future energy requirements and the proper timing for project implementation.
High sustained growth has not been achieved in the past and, unfortunately, it 
is unlikely likely to be the dominant pattern for the foreseeable future (Burki, 2006a). 
Instead, the pattern has been one of roughly a decade of expansion followed by a dec-
ade of rather flat growth rates.3 Patterns of this type, if they continue into the future, 
will create a somewhat different mix of energy requirements than that envisaged in 
the Energy Plan. Also unclear is the likely pattern of future energy prices – how sensi-
tive are the assumed energy supply demand balances to alternative energy scenarios? 
Clearly, these will also have a great effect on both the country’s supply of and demand 
for commercial energy. 
Taking the cyclical nature of Pakistan’s economic performance into account, 
and drawing on recent empirical research examining the complex links between ener-
gy and the economy, the sections that follow attempt to sketch out several alternative 
scenarios of growth and energy needs. In particular, what are some of the key inter-
relationships between sources of energy demand and supply? What are the econom-
ic growth consequences of alternative energy availabilities and in turn how do these 
growth patterns affect the subsequent energy supply and demand patterns? What en-
ergy strategies are suggested by the interconnection between the country growth re-
quirements and energy needs? Are these significantly modified under rising or falling 
energy prices?
1. Energy and the economy – historical patterns
The cyclical nature of Pakistan’s economic progress is sketched out in table 1.4 
The 1960s, 1980s and early 2000s have been periods of rapid expansion in most of the 
standard macroeconomic growth indices. In turn these have affected, albeit to a lesser 
extent, the many measures of individual energy supply and demand. Several other pat-
terns are also of particular interest for meeting the country’s future energy needs:
1. Capital formation has tended to increase at a slower rate than the over-
all economy. The International Monetary Fund has suggested (IMF 
2005, p. 15) that an increase in investment will be necessary if the cur-
rent economic expansion is to be sustained. The IMF also notes that 
the increase in growth over the past several years may have reflected, 
in part, a reduction in excess capacity, as well as favourable weather 
conditions that aided agricultural production – two elements that are 
unlikely to be sustainable in the near term.
2. Domestic oil production has been rather flat in recent years, despite the 
increase in world oil prices – the country may have great difficulties 
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in expanding oil production in the future and will need to look to al-
ternative energy sources or become increasingly dependent on expen-
sive oil imports – an alternative likely to greatly limit future economic 
growth. In this regard, overall energy imports have expanded rapidly 
in recent years, although not nearly to the extent of other South Asian 
countries, such as Sri Lanka and India (figure 2).
Figure 2
Energy imports in South Asia
3. The other dominant energy pattern is the long-run shift in power gen-
eration from hydro sources to oil and coal generators (figure 3). Clear-
ly, much of the country’s current energy crisis stems from the decline in 
hydro sources of energy and an over-reliance on increasingly expensive 
sources of electricity. Oil-fired plants presently account for 68 per cent 
of generation capacity, hydroelectric plants for 30 per cent and nuclear 
plants for only two per cent. This has led one observer to note that:
This thermal-to-hydro ratio of 68 per cent to 30 per cent is a highly 
skewed mix from a generation-cost point of view and has had a huge 
adverse impact on the economy over the last six or seven years as oil 
prices have risen inexorably, pushing up Pakistan’s electricity tariff 
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Table 1
Pakistan: historical economic and energy trends
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–05
Macroeconomic growth indicators
GDP 6.79 4.84 6.86 3.98 5.16
Capital formation 9.82 4.49 5.85 1.93 3.81
Infrastructure 10.35 3.27 5.40 3.01 0.42
Manufacturing 9.75 5.60 8.67 4.29 8.19
Agriculture 4.57 2.66 4.43 4.23 2.83
Industry 10.48 6.59 8.19 4.71 7.15
Services 6.80 6.37 6.77 4.53 5.69
Per capita GDP 3.87 1.62 4.02 1.44 2.86
Population 2.80 3.17 2.74 2.50 2.25
Personal consumption
per capita 2.28 2.14 1.43 2.36 2.77
Investment per capita 6.82 1.28 3.03 –0.56 1.51
Structural and price patterns
Share of capital
formation in GDP 30.83 21.61 20.62 18.84 15.13
Share of manufacturing
in GDP 10.24 11.42 13.00 13.87 15.55
Growth in world oil
price ($/b) 51.52 –2.35 2.04 22.26
Growth in Rupee
oil price 66.11 5.52 11.74 26.04
Growth in energy demand
Oil/petroleum (t) 5.06 8.86 6.37 –1.66
Gas (mm cft) 8.55 7.35 4.92 10.66
Electricity (GWh) 7.86 11.58 4.97 5.99
Coal (metric t) 1.27 7.13 3.30 12.58
Growth in energy supply
Oil: local crude extraction 4.35 19.35 1.92 3.27
Oil: imports 2.60 0.26 2.23 12.59
Oil: total (b) 2.64 3.88 2.00 9.00
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1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–05
Petroleum products
imports 20.96 12.18 10.20 –8.72
Petroleum products
production 2.47 4.39 1.05 10.53
Total petroleum
products (t) 5.26 6.99 5.76 –0.40
Gas (mcf) 8.64 7.60 5.08 10.47
Coal production 1.29 7.61 3.64 5.87
Coal imports –21.48 39.19 0.75 26.59
Total coal (t) 0.90 10.91 2.74 11.09
Electricity installed
capacity (MW) 9.73 7.57 8.31 3.70
Electricity generation
(GWh) 9.43 9.37 6.61 4.62
Hydroelectric installed
capacity (MW) 15.55 6.79 5.81 5.54
Hydroelectric generation
(GWh) 13.26 7.69 3.17 3.18
Thermal installed
capacity (MW) 8.04 8.98 10.43 2.69
Thermal generation
(GWh) 7.44 11.83 9.45 5.05
Nuclear installed
capacity (MW) 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.54
Nuclear generation
capacity (GWh) 20.81 730.08 89.15 81.94
Sources: Pakistan Economics Survey 2005–06, and various issues, Government of Pakistan of Finance, 2006; In-
ternational Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators, 2005.
Note: Infrastructure derived from regressing gross fixed capital formation on its lagged value.
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to one of the highest in the world. This, in turn, has pushed up man-
ufacturing costs, fuelled inflation, and made Pakistani goods less 
competitive in export markets, resulting in a growing trade gap and 
increased pressure on the balance of payments (Omar, 2005).
4. Another important trend is the rapid increase in the share of electricity 
consumed by households as opposed to industry (figure 3). This pat-
tern largely reflects energy pricing and has come under increased criti-
cism by most energy experts (Burki, 2004).
5. Less dramatic are a number of long term relationships that have exist-
ed between the economy and energy supply and demand elements, as 













Total oil/petroleum consumption yes electricity, negative yes
yes coal, negative yes
no gas, negative yes
Electricity yes gas, positive yes
yes coal, positive no
Coal no gas, positive no
Supply interrelationships
Crude oil extraction no coal production, positive yes
yes electricity capacity, negative yes
Gas yes total electricity capacity, positive no
Hydro generation no thermal electricity capacity, negative yes
Thermal generation capacity no hydro electricity capacity, negative yes
Table 2
Pakistan: long-run commercial energy patterns
Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 2006–06, and various issues, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 
2006; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, 2005.
Notes: Estimations made using ARDL approach to cointegration. Estimation interval, 1973–2005, see M. 
Hashem Pesaran and Bahram Pesaran, working with Microfit 4.0.
 Interactive Econometric Analysis, Camfit Data, Cambridge England, 1997 for a description of the meth-
od used. A statistically significant error-correction term suggests the return to a long-run equilibrium 
with the equation variables following a sudden movement in one of them. The coefficient of this term is 
suggestive of the speed of return to equilibrium.
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Pakistan: pattern of electricity consumption by user
Technically,5 these long-term relationships are such that any disturbance caused 
by short-run shocks sets off an adjustment process restoring the longer run patterns. In 
particular, per capita GDP has a stable relationship with a number of energy consump-
tion patterns including oil/petroleum, electricity, and coal. Within these patterns, a se-
ries of positive and negative impacts occur from changes in other forms of energy. For 
example, increased use of coal and gas, negatively impact on oil/petroleum consump-
tion. In addition, expanded thermal electricity capacity has had a distinct negative 
effect on hydro generation (and vice versa), leading at least one knowledgeable ob-
server (Burki, 2006) to note that perhaps the government’s recent attempt to meet the 
country’s immediate energy needs through thermal generation has significantly de-
layed the more economically viable alternative of hydroelectric generation capacity.
2. Energy and the economy – empirical studies
Statistical studies of the links between energy and the Pakistani economy have 
found a number of important relationships. The main finding (Looney, 1992, 1995) is 
that energy use and economic growth are interrelated in that energy expansion leads 
to higher growth and, conversely, its shortage may r tard the growth process. Also, 
the different types of energy affect growth in varying ways. In this reg rd, the impact 
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of electricity and petroleum products, as well as that of electricity only is high and 
statistically significant. However, the reverse causality was found critical only in the 
case of petroleum products.
Focusing on infrastructure and energy, the dominant pattern is one of feedback. 
Specifically, increases in infrastructure and investment tend to lead to an expansion of 
energy output. In turn, this expanded output induces further increases in investment 
and infrastructure. The picture is mixed, however, and generalisations difficult (Loon-
ey, 1992) at the subdivision level. For the period 1972–90:
1. As might be anticipated, increases in public infrastructure in the elec-
tricity, gas and water sector produced a strong follow on expansion of 
energy production. On the other hand, public investment in the sector 
produced only a weak expansion in output.
2. Investment and infrastructure in the Indus Basin – an area where one 
might expect a number of complementary relationships with energy 
development – actually experienced a decrease in energy production 
following expanded investment and infrastructure.
3. General government infrastructure and investment (including that by 
federal, provincial and local authorities) was only weakly associated 
with energy production.
4. Federal infrastructure responded fairly strongly to increased levels of 
energy production. That is, investment by federal authorities did not 
expand energy output. Instead capital formation by this level of gov-
ernment responded to past increases in energy production.
The general picture that develops is one in which infrastructure development 
may have lagged somewhat behind the needs created by the economy – this is con-
sistent with the secular decline in infrastructure noted in table 1. It is also apparent 
that infrastructure and public investment have not initiated an expansion of the energy 
sector to the extent that the authorities might have hoped. At best, public investment 
and infrastructure have expanded, but usually only when prompted by increased lev-
els of energy production (and presumably the pressures that have been associated with 
power shortages, load shedding, etc.)
The above assessment of the interrelationship between public investment and 
energy development suggests serious output constraints, largely related to insufficient 
development of domestic resources. This underdevelopment, in turn, is related to low 
levels of investment which, during 1972–90 had been financed, nearly exclusively by 
the Federal Government. In fact, energy-sector investments (mostly Water and Pow-
er Development Authority) accounted for nearly 50 per cent of the public investment 
programme in FY 1989 and 45 per cent in FY 1990. The policy implications of these 
patterns were clear (Looney, 1992, p. 283):
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The large percentage of a small public investment programme is both 
insufficient and unsustainable, because of conflicting demands from 
other sectors. Therefore, in addition to higher domestic resource mo-
bilisation by the public sector (and by the energy-sector companies), 
increased private sector investment in energy is essential.
Finally, the links between energy and the economy may be strengthening. Re-
search (Looney, 1995) for the period prior to 1990 cast some doubt on the importance 
of investment in the energy sector in Pakistan as a means of accelerating economic 
growth. Specifically, there was little evidence that the overall economic growth of the 
country had been stimulated by the expansion in energy that took place during the pre-
vious decade. Toward the end of the 1980s, the situation appears to have changed. At 
this time, power outages may have reduced GDP by up to 1.8 per cent (Pasha, 1989). 
By the early 1990s, this fact, together a positive linkage from energy to private in-
vestment, was sufficient to justify accelerating the country’s investment in energy ca-
pacity. That this acceleration in investment did not occur in the 1990s and into the 
2000s (table 3) is clearly one of the major contributing factors to the current en-
ergy crisis.
Table 3
Pakistan: investment in electricity and gas
(Rupees million, constant prices of 1999–2000)
Year Total Private Public
1999–2000 67,354 15,169 52,185
2000–01 65,582 14,796 50,785
2001–02 52,804 32,632 20,173
2002–03 50,119 23,001 27,118
2003–04 16,934 2,044 14,890
2004–05 25,978 4,926 21,052
2005–06 32,628 11,339 21,290
Average annual growth –11.40% –4.70% –13.90%
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, 2005–06
3. A macro-energy forecasting model
Drawing on the empirical work noted above, a macro-energy forecasting model 
was constructed. Its main features (figure 4) are summarised below:6
1. Expanded per capita income is assumed to be a function of energy 
availability and capital formation. Statistically, in addition to capital 
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formation, gas, coal and hydro-electric generation have the strongest 
statistical links to per capita income.
2. In turn, per capita income affects both the demand for total energy, as 
well as domestic sources of energy. 
3. The world dollar price of oil times the Rupee exchange rate was found 
to be statistically significant in a number of energy supply and demand 
relationships.
4. As noted above, a number of energy demand relationships are com-
petitive – expanded use of one type of energy comes at the expense of 
another. Also, several types of energy expansion discourage output in-
creases in others. Complementarities also exist between different types 
of energy on both the demand and supply side. 
5. To capture these effects, a vector autoregression (VAR) model was 
constructed. The model was then used to quantify past economic/en-
ergy patterns as the basis for forecasts to the year 2035. The interre-

























































Pakistan: macro-energy forecasting model
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lationships between the various types of energy are captured through 
the use of lagged values (previous years). Specifically, each category 
of energy, for example coal, is estimated based on values of the previ-
ous year for other sources of energy – gas, electricity etc in addition to 
other independent variables such as per capita GDP.
Model Stage I: energy availabilities and future levels of per capita GDP
As a first step in forecasting future energy balances, specified levels of total en-
ergy availability – total gas supply, total coal supply and hydroelectric generation (fig-
ure 3) together with assumed levels of gross capital formation determine the future 
values of a number of macroeconomic variables. These include:
(a) GDP per capita;
(b) private consumption per capita; and
(c) government consumption per capita.
Investment per capita and infrastructure were derived from the assumed pat-
tern of investment. The energy variables were selected based on their statistical sig-
nificance in affecting the macroeconomic variables included in the model. Next, sev-
en different energy/investment scenarios are considered, each based on different 
assumptions concerning patterns and rates of investment and energy availability. 
These scenarios are constructed in a manner that assures that overall per capita in-
come increases improve over their historical patterns (table 1). More importantly, 
energy expansion is not looked at just in terms of specific power outputs. Rather, the 
models attempt to show the likely manner in which different investment/energy sup-
ply mixes interact with the overall economy to produce higher standards of living.
Model 1: Base line forecast – consolidated growth
In this scenario, gross capital formation and the three key energy variables are 
assumed to expand at a rate of three per cent p.a. This forecast is assumed to be the 
worst case scenario – the current growth phase ends, resource constraints and per-
haps political uncertainties undermine efforts to attract foreign investment and aid. 
However, investment or energy availability does not decline as dramatically as in the 
1970s or 1990s. Growth largely occurs through consolidating and extending various 
economic and governance reforms.
Model 2: Continuation of the historical pattern of cyclical growth
The current growth phase extends to 2010 followed by flatter growth up to 2020 
with another expansion and levelling off in the 2020–30 and 2030–35 periods. The as-
sumed values for the growth of gross capital formation and the energy components for 
the periods, 2006–10, 2011–20, 2021–30, 2031–35 are as follows: gross capital for-
mation, four per cent, two per cent, four per cent, two per cent; gas, ten per cent, seven 
per cent, ten per cent, seven per cent; coal, four per cent, 11 per cent, four per cent, 11 
per cent; hydro generation, six per cent, four per cent, six per cent, four per cent.
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Model 3: Historical pattern of cyclical growth, but with political opposition pre-
venting a major expansion in new dam construction
In this scenario, efforts to over-come regional opposition to new dams fail. As a 
result, hydroelectric generation expansion is limited to three per cent p.a. Other vari-
ables are assumed to expand as in Model 2.
Model 4: Government investment led growth, but with emphasis on social pro-
grammes
In this scenario, the country is able to attract and mobilise sufficient resources 
to sustain rates of gross capital formation at six per cent. However, a shift in expendi-
ture priorities allocates a larger share of government resources to social investments – 
education, health, etc., rather than energy. The private sector is left to fund added in-
vestment in the energy sector. The private sector responds with gas and coal expand-
ing at seven per cent and five per cent, respectively, but hydroelectric generation ex-
panding as the historical pattern assumed in Model 2. 
Model 5: Private-sector-led growth
As in Model 4, the private sector mobilises sufficient resources to expand gas 
and coal supplies by seven per cent and fiver per cent p.a. over the period to 2035. 
However, the public sector, unable to pursue adequate tax reform, is constrained to its 
historical cyclical pattern of investment. As a result gross capital formation and hy-
dro-electric generation are assumed to expand as in Model 2.
Model 6: Expanded dam construction and hydroelectric capacity
Political impediments to new dam construction are overcome; the World Bank 
and other donors supply adequate funds for a major expansion in the country’s hy-
droelectric generation capacity. Gross capital formation increases at six per cent p.a. 
with hydroelectric generation expanding as follows: 2006–10, five per cent, 2011–20, 
seven per cent, 2021–30, nine per cent, 2030–35, 11 per cent. The vast expansion in 
hydroelectric capacity lessens the perceived profitability of investment in coal and gas 
development. Total supplies of these energy sources are assumed to expand at rates of 
three per cent p.a. over the period to 2035.
Model 7: Coal/gas-led energy expansion
For some of the reasons noted above, hydroelectric expansion is constrained and 
overall investment levels follow the historical cyclical patterns. Concerns over energy 
shortages, however, lead to the creation of a number of incentives for investment in 
coal and to a lesser extent gas. Total supplies of these two energy sources are assumed 
to expand at rates of seven per cent p.a. during the forecasting period. 
Each of the models produces a distinctive pattern of per capita income expan-
sion over the period to 2035. All are improvements over the base line forecast. Several 
results (table 4) are of particular interest:
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Table 4
Pakistan: growth in per capita GDP under different energy strategies
Average annual growth 2005–09 2010–19 2020–29 2030–35
1. Base line 3.34 2.09 2.34 2.44
2. Historical cyclical pattern 6.11 3.84 6.67 4.90
3. Historical cyclical –
    lagging hydro 5.53 3.39 6.16 4.56
4. Investment led growth –
    energy lag 5.03 4.08 5.00 5.09
5. Normal investm./hydro –
    low coal, gas 4.93 3.66 4.85 4.70
6. High investm./hydro
    strategy 4.05 3.85 5.56 7.37
7. Moderate emphasis on
    coal and gas 4.56 3.54 4.54 4.79
8. High emphasis on coal
    and gas 5.51 5.28 7.27 8.27
9. Maximum growth 6.00 6.55 8.35 9.49
Notes: Simulations based on VAR model of order 2. Dependent variables: (1) per capita GDP, (2) per cap-
ita private consumptions, (3) per capita government consumption. Independent variables: (1) gross 
fixed capital formation, (2) total gas supply, (3) total coal supply and (4) hydroelectric generation. 
All economic variables are in constant prices of year 2000. Estimation interval, 1973–2000. See M. 
Hashem Pesaran and Bahram Pesaran, working with Microfit 4.0, Interactive Econometric Analy-
sis Camfit Data, Cambridge, England, 1997, for a description of the method used.
Simulation assumptions:
Model 1: Investment and energy expand at 3% p.a.
Model 2: For periods 2006–10, 2011–20, 2021–30, 2031–35: investment 4%, 2%, 4 %, 2%; gas 10%, 7%, 
10%; coal 4%, 11%, 4%, 11%; hydro 7%, 4%, 6%, 4%.
Model 3: Model 2 pattern of investment, coal and gas, but hydroelectric generation held to 3% p.a.
Model 4: Investment 6%, gas 7%, coal 5%, hydro as in Model 2.
Model 5: Gas 7%, coal 5% investment and hydro as in Model 2.
Model 6: Investment 6%, gas 3%, coal 3%, hydro 2006–10: 5%, 2011–20: 7%, 2021–20: 9%, 2030–35: 11%.
Model 7: Investment as in Model 2, gas 7%, coal 11%, hydro 3%.
Model 8: Investment as in Model 2, gas 10%, coal 11%, hydro 3%.
Model 9: Investment 6%, gas 10%, coal 11%, hydro as in Model 6.
Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 2005–06, and various issues, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of 
Finance, 2006; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues, 
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.
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1. As might be expected, maximum growth occurs in later periods under 
the major expansion in hydro capacity (Model 6).
2. The limited development of domestic coal (Model 5) seems to provide 
the least satisfactory of the highly viable strategies. Growth rates un-
der this strategy lag considerably behind the historical/cyclical scenar-
io (Model 2).
3. The historical cyclical pattern (Model 2) has the quickest pay-off, but 
its boom and bust nature may make for lower rates of investment in 
certain types of domestic energy. Based on the workings of the macro-
energy model, lower rates of investment would have their greatest im-
pact on domestic supplies of thermal electricity generation.
4. A strategy emphasising coal and gas (Model 7) produces quicker gains 
in income than the hydro strategy, but after 2010 the hydro strategy re-
sults in more rapid gains in per capita income.
5. High sustained growth can occur without a major expansion in energy 
(Model 4). However, with changing and unforeseen future technolo-
gies, this may be a risky alternative exposing the country to world en-
ergy price fluctuations and interruption of supplies. 
The results should be taken with a note of caution – they are simply suggestive 
of certain patterns on the assumption that many historical relationships continue to 
prevail. Clearly, unforeseen shocks during the forecast period would modify, perhaps 
significantly, the rates of per capita income growth reported below. Another factor to 
consider is the actual feasibility of a particular model. Clearly, Model 1 is more feasi-
ble than Models 4 or 6, which rely on sustained levels of investment well over those 
experienced in the past. 
Finally, as the models’ relationships weaken due to future policy changes such 
as price deregulation, the relationships will be further modified. Looked at from this 
perspective, the models’ forecast of future consumption patterns balanced against 
likely expansion of domestic energy sources provides a framework for examining 
various policy options.
Model Stage 2: Future patterns of energy consumption 
Future patterns of energy consumption associated with each of the models sum-
marised above are derived from another VAR model using as key inputs, the output 
from the first stage of the macro-energy model – primarily GDP per capita and per-
sonal consumption per capita. In addition, another variable reflecting broad world oil 
price movements is introduced. Despite the fact that world oil price movements are 
not translated directly into the domestic prices for various types of energy, several 
highly statistically significant relationships were found.7 In particular, gas and coal 
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consumption in Pakistan has increased fairly markedly with increases in the world 
price of oil. Electricity has been less affected by oil prices, and consumption of oil/pe-
troleum products does not appear to be influenced by world oil prices.
The VAR model was specified so that in addition to per capita GDP, per capita 
consumption and oil prices, consumption of the main energy components is a function 
of the past consumption of the other main sources of fuel. This specification facilitates 
the identification of possible energy demand trade-offs – the substitution of one type 
of energy by another. Here, several patterns were found to stand out (table 5):8
Table 5
Pakistan: energy trade-offs and complementarities
Energy consumption Oil/petroleum Gas Electricity Coal
gas (–) oil/petroleumcoal (–, strong) none
oil/petroleum
(–, strong)













1. If the goal of Pakistan’s energy policy is to reduce dependence on oil 
and petroleum, then expanded gas consumption is one possible strat-
egy, although this relationship appeared relatively weak in the macro-
energy model.
2. On the other hand, both oil/petroleum and particularly coal consump-
tion appear to come at the expense of gas consumption. 
3. Other fuels do not appear to compete with electricity, while expanded 
consumption of oil/petroleum has sharply reduced coal consumption.
Model Stage 3: Future patterns of domestic energy production 
As with energy demand, future patterns of domestic energy production associat-
ed with Models 1–7 were identified with a third VAR model using the output from the 
first stage of the macro-energy model. To capture supply side constraints as opposed 
to the previous demand oriented assessment, infrastructure was substituted for per 
capita consumption as an independent variable along with per capita GDP and world 
oil prices. In the case of supply, increased oil prices provided a strong stimulus to in-
creased gas production, as well as thermal electricity. Infrastructure constraints were 
mainly associated with thermal electricity.
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The main energy supply trade-offs identified by the VAR model showed (table 4) 
petroleum products to be adversely affected by expanded thermal electricity. Some-
what surprisingly, thermal electricity also had a weak adverse effect on coal produc-
tion – no doubt the result of the substitution of oil for coal in generating electricity. 
Increased production of coal on the other hand was strongly associated with higher 
levels of thermal electricity.
Model Stage 4: Future energy demand supply balances 
The results of the forecasts of energy demand and domestic supplies produced in 
stages 3 and 4 yielded some interesting patterns. Two sets of forecasts were made: (1) the 
first under the assumption of gradually falling oil prices – the world oil price, converted to 
rupees, declining at an average rate of three per cent p.a. over the forecast period; and (2) 
the second in an environment of gradually rising oil prices – three per cent p.a. 
The results of the first set of supply demand balances are summarised in table 6, 
while the results for the second set are reported in table 7. 
It should be noted that the supply demand balances by type of energy are not 
strictly comparable due to the manner in which the first stage model was construct-
ed. The first stage model was primarily interested in examining the effects of energy 
availability, especially hydro electricity on economic growth. The macro economic 
variables used in the supply and demand forecasts – per capita GDP, per capita private 
consumption, and investment per capita – have already factored in hydro’s contribu-
tion to the country’s electricity supply. 
The supply forecasts presented in tables 6 and 7 are for the expansion in thermal 
capacity. No assumptions were made concerning nuclear generation of electricity. To-
tal domestic generation of electricity would, therefore, be the assumed levels of hy-
dro generation plus that generated from the forecasted thermal capacity and whatever 
nuclear power might be made available in the future. Since hydro electricity currently 
comprises approximately 30 per cent of total electricity even at fast rates of expan-
sion, it will be some time before this source of electricity makes a significant contri-
bution to the country’s overall electricity supply. Hence, the thermal energy forecasts 
are suggestive, albeit very roughly, of the likely supply situation.
A second factor to keep in mind in interpreting the future energy supply and de-
mand balances presented in table 6 is that the supply of energy does not include do-
mestic oil extraction. Domestic oil extraction was not correlated with any of the vari-
ables in the VAR energy supply model. Specifically, production of this energy source 
does not appear to be greatly affected by per capita GDP, infrastructure or oil prices. 
Nor is oil extraction influenced by the production levels of other energy variables. In 
addition there are great uncertainties as to the amount of reserves the country will be 
able to develop in the future – past rates of extraction no doubt provide little insights 
as to future rates of production. The prospects are not bright for major discoveries, 
although some off-shore areas show some promise. In short, there is little basis on 
which to project this source of energy. 
A related issue concerns the breakdown by energy sub-category in the avail-
able data. The Pakistan Economic Survey publishes data on the supply of petroleum 
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products but no separate figure for the demand for this category of energy. Compari-
sons of demand (oil/petroleum) and supply (petroleum products) provide only the 
roughest picture for this category of energy. Taking these caveats into account, several 
distinctive supply/demand patterns emerge:
Model 1: At low rates of economic growth and falling oil prices, gas supplies 
would run well below demand in the years up to 2030. Electricity supplies would be 
short of anticipated need between 2010 and 2020 and perhaps again after 2030. Con-
siderable amounts of coal are currently imported, but these would likely decline in the 
early years. Coal shortfalls might appear after 2010, becoming particularly severe in 
the 2020s. The gap between the demand for oil/petroleum and the supply of petrole-
um products would be particularly severe the early years – up to 2010. However, after 
2010, supply and demand come more into balance. 
With rising oil prices, the situation changes dramatically. Gas supplies are rough-
ly in line with demand throughout the forecast period. Coal supplies improve dramati-
cally in the period up to 2010 and might not encounter shortfalls until the 2020s. Also, 
a big jump in thermal electricity generation relieves pressures in the electricity mar-
kets throughout the forecast period. The oil/petroleum and petroleum products seg-
ment of the energy market follows essentially the same patterns experienced with fall-
ing oil prices – severe shortfalls in the period up to 2010 followed by a rough balance 
throughout the rest of the forecast period.
Model 2: A continuation of the country’s pattern of cyclical economic growth 
during a prolonged period of falling oil prices produces a sharply contrasting pic-
ture. Domestic gas production lags considerably behind demand throughout the fore-
cast period up to 2030. Electricity supplies might be adequate up to 2010, but would 
experience a severe shortfall up to 2020, remaining in rough balance for the rest of 
the forecast period. Coal supplies are also adequate up to 2010, but might experience 
shortfalls after that date. As with Model 1 the gap between oil/petroleum and petro-
leum products is severe in the early years, but not after 2010.
With rising oil prices, domestic gas supplies improve dramatically. However, 
the demand for gas also increases somewhat. The net result is a shortfall throughout 
the entire forecasting period, with the shortfalls becoming particularly severe in the 
2020s in to the early 2030s. Electricity supplies also expand, but not enough to stave 
off severe shortfalls in the 2020s. In contrast, coal follows a pattern similar to what 
might be expected in a period of falling prices – initial surpluses, followed by a long 
period of rough supply demand balance, with perhaps demand slightly outrunning 
supply. Oil/petroleum and petroleum products fluctuate between severe shortages in 
the initial years, balance up to 2020 followed by surpluses in the 2020s and deficits 
in the early 2030s.
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Model 3: In an era of falling energy prices and with hydroelectricity held at low 
levels of expansion, electricity experiences shortfalls up to 2030, with the gap be-
tween demand and supply especially severe in the 2020s. Domestic gas supplies are 
also inadequate throughout the forecast period. The pattern is one of moderate short-
falls up to 2010 gradually worsening up to 2030. In contrast, coal might not experi-
ence a shortfall with regard to demand until the 2020s with supply outrunning demand 
again in the early 2030s. Oil/petroleum and petroleum products are again in deficit in 
the early years, roughly in balance up to 2020 with large surpluses in the 2020s. Defi-
cits, however, return in the early 2030s. 
With rising oil prices, thermal electricity expands sufficiently to meet domes-
tic demand. However, a shortfall is likely in the 2030s with demand again surpassing 
supply. Coal production expands faster than demand in the early years significantly 
reducing imports. After 2010, supply and demand are in rough balance. Although gas 
production again increases with rising oil prices, production increases lag behind ex-
panded demand throughout the period up to 2035. The gap between demand and sup-
ply becomes particularly large in the 2020s. Oil/petroleum and petroleum products 
continue their fluctuating pattern of alternating deficits and surpluses beginning with 
large deficits in the period up to 2010.
Model 4: High rates of overall national investment produce another unique pat-
tern of energy balances. With falling oil prices, the gaps between demand and supply 
are generally lower than in the two previous models. After an initial period of early 
shortfalls, gas production expands to meet demand over the remainder of the forecast 
period. In addition, over the whole forecast period electricity supplies also expand at 
a slightly faster rate than demand. The same is true for coal, with the exception of a 
slight supply shortfall in the early 2030s. Even the fluctuations in oil/petroleum petro-
leum products are dampened, especially after an initial period of sharp shortfalls.
Rising oil prices do not fundamentally alter this picture. Instead in most cases 
supply improves slightly relative to demand to further relieve pressures in the energy 
markets.
Model 5 is characterised by a limited availability of coal, together with a cy-
clical pattern of investment similar to that experienced in the past. If oil prices ex-
perience a gradual decline, energy supply and demand balances are not particularly 
favourable. A sizeable gas shortfall occurs in the early years to 2010, increasing some-
what in the years to 2020 and then continuing to 2035. After an initial period of coal 
production expanding faster than demand, it also experiences shortfalls to the end of 
the projection period. These may not, however, be as significant as those associated 
with gas. After an initial surplus, terminal electricity expansion lags behind expected 
need, although this may be largely made up with the anticipated expansion from hy-
dro sources. After an initial deficit, only oil/petroleum petroleum products experience 
sustained periods of domestic supply exceeding demand. 
While Model 5 produces a very favourable set of energy balances for falling 
oil prices, the shifts in demand toward gas, coal and electricity with rising oil prices 
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erode much of this potential gain. Gas demand consistently outruns supply as is also 
the case for coal after 2010. Electricity follows the same path as coal, but again ex-
panded hydroelectric sources assumed in stage 1 of the macro energy model, six per 
cent for 2006–10, four per cent for 2011–20, six per cent for 2021–30, and four per 
cent for 2030–35 may be sufficient to accommodate expanded demand. The Oil/pe-
troleum and petroleum products balance is also not as favourable as in the case of fall-
ing oil prices. Still, after an initial deficit experienced in other models, supply matches 
demand fairly closely until 2030 when it accelerates more rapidly.
Model 6 focuses on expanded hydro sources of electricity together with high 
overall rates of sustained investment. As noted in the discussion of the macro ener-
gy model, this combination results in a sustained acceleration of per capita GDP af-
ter 2010. The resulting increase in demand for other energy resources together with a 
stimulus to expand other sources of energy produces a unique pattern of energy bal-
ances. After an initial shortfall of supply, the oil/petroleum – petroleum products bal-
ance is nearly equalised in the period up to 2020. Gas on the other hand, experiences 
chronic shortfalls of supply especially in the 2020s. Supplies of electricity should be 
adequate, especially in light of the acceleration in hydro sources. Still, thermal capac-
ity is projected to lag somewhat behind overall electricity demand after 2010. Domes-
tic coal expansion also fails to meet the expanded demand after 2010. 
As in the earlier models, rising oil prices assist in bringing demand and supply 
increases more into balance. This is especially the case for gas and coal in the period 
up to 2020, although after that date demand significantly outruns supply.
Model 7 assumes fairly abundant supplies of gas and coal, with investment less 
dynamic than in the previous model. This produces, except for the base line mod-
el, average rates of economic growth somewhat below most of the other models. As 
noted earlier, it produces higher rates of growth than the hydro strategy in the earlier 
years, but this growth flattens out in the latter years, falling considerably below that 
associated with a major expansion in dam construction. With falling world oil pric-
es, this mix produces growth in domestic gas supplies lagging behind demand, espe-
cially in the 2020s. After expanding fairly rapidly in the early years, the expansion in 
domestic coal production also fails to keep pace with demand after 2010. In contrast, 
thermal electricity keeps up with demand in the early years only to fall sharply be-
hind over the period 2010–20. After that, demand and supply are fairly balanced until 
shortfalls occur again after 2030. Oil/petroleum – petroleum products revert to its nor-
mal pattern of supply lagging behind demand in alternating decades.
Rising oil prices bring coal supply and demand growth largely into equality af-
ter 2010. The same is not true of gas, however, where shortfalls continue after 2010. 
Electricity also fails to keep pace with demand after 2010.
4. Implications
In summing up, which alternatives appear to be the best? While the government 
has limited control over the manner in which Pakistan’s energy picture will unfold, 
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several generalisations from the models examined above may provide some guidance.
If the goal is to improve energy balances, especially for coal, electricity, and gas, 
then high oil prices that encourage increased production are more conducive than de-
clining prices. With the good chance of growth accelerating in Models 4, 6, and 7 after 
2010, there is a possibility for the establishment of a virtuous circle (figure 5) where 
expanded demand for coal, electricity, and gas increase profitability in these sectors, 
thus stimulating expanded investment and further growth.
While the government has little control over international prices, it does con-
trol the Rupee exchange rate. In this regard, it should not postpone devaluations, but 
allow the currency to transmit world oil price increases into the domestic market. In 
the future, the authorities should strive toward an energy pricing system that more re-
flects the true cost of energy. If high sustained growth is sought, then an environment 
characterised by high rates of sustained investment together with hydro development 
(Model 6) may be the best course, especially if substantial loans from international 
agencies are forthcoming. This environment may be the most conducive to a virtu-
ous circle.
Higher rates of GDP growth have other benefits. Ironically lower rates of eco-
nomic growth may be more plagued by energy imbalances than higher rates of growth. 
In the future, low rates of growth may compound this problem by making the country 
less competitive in attracting significant inflows of direct foreign investment.
If world oil prices fall for a prolonged period of time, the country should defi-
nitely pursue a high investment/growth policy such as outlined in Model 4, 6 or 7. 
With falling profitability in oil, gas, and coal development and the limited prospects 
for expansion in oil, private investment might not be sufficient to maintain high rates 
of sustained economic growth. The energy imbalances experienced at low rates of 
Figure 5
Pakistan: a virtuous circle of expanded energy supply and growth
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economic expansion would put stress on the country’s balance of payments, further 
discouraging capital inflows to the country. In short, the high energy imbalances asso-
ciated with low growth in an atmosphere of falling energy prices is conducive to the 
creation of a vicious circle (figure 6).
Figure 6
Pakistan: a vicious circle of stunted energy supply and growth
5. Assessment
The purpose of this paper is to provide an exploratory analysis of Pakistan’s en-
ergy futures. As such, the forecasting model developed here provides only a rough 
order of magnitudes, and should be looked at as a very preliminary approximation of 
Pakistan’s energy needs. Its strength is in identifying areas of potential trouble and in 
the need for corrective policy responses. Contrary to the country’s energy plans, it has 
the advantage of taking into account many of the complementarities and competitive 
relationships between the major types of energy. Its links to the economy also enable 
energy to be looked at as more than just an output or an end in-and-of itself. In the 
perspective developed here, energy, while not necessarily a leading sector, takes on 
the important role of facilitating higher rates of economic growth and material well 
being. It becomes an integral part of the economy, calling attention to its critical role 
in the country’s future. 
While these are valuable aspects, the model clearly has many areas that could be 
strengthened. The model implicitly assumes that a major goal of energy policy is to 
become less dependent on imported petroleum and petroleum products. Other objec-
tives should be examined and their feasibility assessed. The same also applies to oil 
prices – the effects of long run-fluctuations in oil prices rather than steady increases 
or declines should be explored and their results checked for any marked differences 
from the results reported above.
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Another of refinement called for is a more detailed assessment of the technolog-
ical, financial and political constraints surrounding the supplies of the various types 
of energy. For example, have the historical constraints, mainly absence of water in 
the desert producing locations and limiting the development of coal been overcome 
through recent technological advances? Are political obstacles to expanded major 
dam construction likely to constrain the rates of hydro power assumed here? What are 
the chances of instability in Baluchistan in preventing the expansion of domestic gas 
supplies projected by the model? 
Clearly an important issue not dealt with directly involves regional energy coop-
eration. Currently Pakistan, along with the other South Asian economies, is exploring 
the possibility of developing a common energy grid. To date, political obstacles have 
left some countries with a power deficit and others with abundance. Nepal and Bhutan 
have substantial untapped hydroelectricity potential, while Bangladesh has large gas 
reserves that could be used domestically or exported to Pakistan, as well as India and 
Sri Lanka – if only the infrastructure existed to carry it. While the economic benefits 
of closer regional cooperation appear clear, competing political interests and, at times, 
open hostility have stymied the effort. 
In terms of imports, the great uncertainty is finance – will Pakistan have the fi-
nancial resources, or be able to induce international investors to provide some of the 
magnitudes currently under discussion? In this regard, the Pakistani government is at-
tempting to mobilise international investors to invest in the $7bn Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline, $5bn in the Turkmenistan-Pakistan-India pipeline and $8bn on the Qatar- 
Pakistan-India gas pipelines. 
On a more technical level, while the forecasts suggest that higher oil prices as-
sist in bringing the country’s energy supply and demand patterns more in balance, are 
there any adverse feedback effects on the overall rate of per capita GDP growth? Be-
cause no direct statistical links between oil prices and per capita GDP were found, the 
model implicitly assumes this not to be the case. Yet, common sense suggests that at 
some point, higher world prices, or perhaps an acceleration in prices, must take a toll 
on incomes. These possibilities should be examined in greater detail.
While the model suggests certain policy actions, the impact of these measures 
is difficult to predict in any systematic way. In particular, without a more extensive 
macroeconomic framework, it is difficult to assess the feasibility of sustained levels of 
energy imports to bridge the gap between demand and domestic supply. Under certain 
balance of payment situations, these shortfalls could be easily financed, while under 
others the same shortfalls would create a severe stress on the economy. Much depends 
on the availability of foreign direct investment and the extent to which these funds 
could be directed toward expanding domestic energy sources.
This final point leads to the general conclusion that what takes place outside the 
energy sector may have consequences that are just as important for the country’s en-
ergy picture as policies and events directly affecting the sector.
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Footnotes
1. Revised version of paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre Confer-
ence, “Meeting Pakistan’s energy needs in the 21st century,” Washington, DC, 23 June 
2006.
2. Useful summaries can be found in Rizvi (2006), Government of Pakistan (2005) and Ali 
(2005).
3. As documented in Looney (2004, 2001).
4. Oil prices are from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
They are the average crude price in $/barrel with the average including Dubai Fateh, 
United Kingdom Brent and West Texas Intermediate.
5. They are identified as statistically co-integrated. Cf Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for a 
description of this statistical property and the best means to identify its occurrence. See 
the Appendix for a more detailed description of the approach. Detailed results are avail-
able from the author upon request.
6. The detailed statistical results are available from the author upon request.
7. As noted earlier the oil price proxy is the average world oil price (IMF data) multiplied 
by the Rupee dollar exchange rate.
8. The vector autoregression results are short run impacts – in this case last year’s ener-
gy consumption of various types on each of the main areas of consumption. As such, the 
trade-offs are not comparable with the longer term patterns noted in table 2.
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The null hypothesis of no cointegration is H0 : b1 = 0. If the null is rejected, Xt 
and Yt are cointegrated.
The cointegration relation Xt –   Yt = 0 represents a long-term equilibrium rela-
tion between Xt and Yt, and the cointegration factor Zt can be used to measure the de-
viation from this long-term relation. Engle and Granger (1987) suggest estimating the 
value of    by performing the following regression:
Appendix
Estimation methods
The various statistical relationships noted in table 2 linking energy with the 
economy were estimated using a cointegration error-correction model (ECM) as de-
veloped in Pesaran and Pesaran, Microfit 4.0. The advantage of this model is that it al-
lows the identification of non-spurious relationships without forcing the loss of long-
run information. Moreover, ECM allows for suitable economic interpretations since 
it incorporates equilibrium relationships as suggested by economic theory, along with 
the possibility of variables responding to short-run disequilibrium. The concept of 
cointegration provides the link between integrated processes and the concept of equi-
librium. It was originally developed by Granger (1980) and extended by Engle and 
Granger (1987).
More formally, if Xt and Yt are both non-stationary in levels, but stationary in 
the first differences, they are said to be integrated of order one, denoted by I(1). If Xt 
and Yt are both I(1), their linear combinations of the form Zt = Xt –   Yt are gener-
ally also I(1). However, if there is an    such that Zt is integrated of order zero or I(0), 
the liner combination of Xt and Yt is stationary, and the two variables are said to be 
cointegrated.
Engle and Granger (1987) propose several ways of testing for cointegration. In 
this paper we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1981) test, because it has good 
power properties for first-order and higher-order systems. The ADF test of cointegra-
tion consists of first performing the following cointegration regression:
∀
∀
X c c Yt t t= + +0 1 γ (1)
Then performing the following ADF regression on the residuals of equation 1
γ γ γ γ γ µt t t t i
i
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t i tb− = + − +− − −
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By knowing   1, the cointegration factor Z1 can be obtained from
X Yt t t= ∀ +∀ +0 1 γ (3)
∀
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Engle and Granger (1987) combine the concept of causality in the Granger sense 
and the notion of cointegration to develop a model that allows testing for both short-
term and long-term relations between two time series. The model is the ECM. The fol-
lowing ECM investigates the potential long- and short-term effects of X on Y:
Z X Yt t t= −∀
⊇
(4)
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The ECM of the above equation decomposes the dynamic adjustments of the 
dependent variable Y into two components. The first is a long-term component given 




also known as the error correction term. The correction adjustments of Yt to a disequi-
librium error from the previous period Zt–1 can be spread over several periods, with the 
coefficient a1 indicating the speed of the correction mechanism. The second compo-
nent is a short-term component given by the summation terms on the right-hand side 
of equation 5. These two terms represent past changes in X and Y and characterise the 
short-term dynamics. Specifically, the first summation term in equation 5 gives the 
short-term effect of X on Y.
Similarly, the following ECM expresses the long- and short-term effects of Y on X:
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From equations 5 and 6, it follows that Xt and Yt are cointegrated when at least 
one of the coefficients a1 or   1 is different from zero. In this case, Xt and Yt exhibit 
long-term co-movements. When a1 is different from zero, but    1 is zero, Yt follows 
and adjusts to Xt in the long term. The opposite occurs when   1 is different from zero, 
but a1 is zero. When both coefficients, a1 and   1 are different from zero, a feedback ex-
ists and the two variables adjust to one another over the long term.
The coefficients bi’s and NI’s represent the short-term relation between Xt and 
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short term. The reverse is true when NI’s are not all zero but all bi’s are zero. When 
both events occur, a feedback exists and the two variables affect each other in the 
short term.
A key issue in error-correction cointegration analysis is the specification of an 
optimal lag structure for the autoregressive model (ARDL) (the author is indebted to 
an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach). Here we have used the ARDL 
procedure developed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). Essentially, the procedure be-
gins with the selection of a fairly long lag period. The Schwartz-Bayesian criterion 
is then used to determine the optimal lag pattern. The programme then provides esti-
mates of the ECM which corresponds to the selected ARDL model.
Finally these relationships form the basis of the forecasts developed in Models 
1–7. Here, a standard, VAR is developed using lagged values and exogenous specified 
variables i.e., investment gas, coal, and hydro in Model 1 to forecast future values of 
per capita income. Again the optimal lag structure of past values is tested using the 
Schwartz-Bayesian criterion.
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